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Abstract
Waller and Walsh (1996) argue that the optimal term length of the central
banker can exceed one period when the central bank is conservative enough. How-
ever, the optimal conservativeness is unlikely to be exogenous. In this note we show
how the optimal conservativeness and the optimal term length are determined si-
multaneously in the framework of Waller and Walsh. Furthermore, we extend the
study to the in°ation contract and the in°ation target regimes. Under both regimes,
the optimal parameter of conservativeness is independent of the term length and
is always 1. Moreover, it is possible of have an optimal multi-term central banker
under both the state-contingent in°ation contract regime and the state-contingent
in°ation target regime.
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1In an article recently published in the American Economic Review, Waller and Walsh
(1996) (referred to henceforth as W&W) o®er a uni¯ed framework for analyzing both the
optimal term length and the independence (conservativeness) of the central bank. They
conclude that when there is political uncertainty and persistent shifts in public preferences,
the appointment of a conservative central banker is able to increase the optimal term
length and therefore lead to lower average in°ation, without necessarily increasing the
volatility of output. The (necessary) condition for achieving the optimal multi-term length
is that the parameter of conservativeness should exceed a constant critical value. They
treat the parameter of the conservativeness as a given constant throughout their paper.
However, as suggested by many other studies, the degree of the conservativeness should
be optimally determined. By introducing a determination of the optimal parameter of
the conservativeness into the W&W model, we obtain a sequence of optimal parameters
associated with the term length instead of a single constant. Furthermore, from our point
of view, the optimal term length and the optimal conservativeness should be determined
simultaneously. Therefore, the longest optimal term length might not be the optimal
solution for welfare maximization.
In this note, we show how the optimal conservativeness and the optimal term length
are determined simultaneously on the basis of the W&W model. We also give an example
to demonstrate the possibility of a multi-equilibrium solution. Furthermore, we study
the case of an in°ation contract and an in°ation target, which are mentioned by W&W
without any clear conclusion. We conclude that the parameter of optimal conservativeness
is always 1 under both the in°ation contract regime and the in°ation target regime.
Under both the constant in°ation contract and the constant in°ation target regimes, the
optimal term length is always one-term. Moreover, it is possible to have an optimal multi-
term central banker under the state-contingent in°ation contract and the state-contingent
in°ation target regimes.
1 Simpli¯ed W&W Model and Solution
We ¯rst simplify the model established by W&W, since many factors in the original
paper do not seem to be important for the issue of determining the optimal term length
T and the optimal conservativeness ¯. Ignoring the money market (the velocity shock
2and the monetary shock) and the supply shocks speci¯c to individual sectors would have
no consequences for the discussion in this note. We here assume that the central bank is
able to control in°ation completely and precisely.
The (log) sectorial output yit is determined as follows:
yit = y
N + ¸(¼t ¡ ¼
e) + ut; (1)
(Log) yN is the natural rate of output and is a constant across the sectors. ¼t is the
in°ation rate and ¼e is the expected in°ation rate based on the information available at
time t ¡ 1: The economy-wide supply shock ut is a zero-mean process with a constant
variance ¾2
u:
The desired in°ation rate ¼¤
M;t preferred by the median voter at time t randomly varies






M;t + "t: (2)
The mean ¦¤







M;t with probability p
¦¤
M;t + ¢t+1 with probability 1 ¡ p;
(3)
where ¢ is a zero-mean process with a constant variance ¾2
¢. The in°ation rate preferred









The parameter µ; which is between 0 and 1; re°ects the degree of partisanship in the
appointment process. If µ = 0; the central banker merely follows the mean.











i is the in°ation rate desired by sector i and is assumed to be distributed uniformly
over the range [L;U] with a constant variance ¾2

















where ¯ ¸ 1; indicating that the central bank can be more conservative than the society.
3We suppose that the monetary policy is carried out by an instrument independent
central bank. In other words, the central bank can carry out the monetary policy inde-
pendently in order to minimize its own loss function (6). A party is able to in°uence
monetary policy via the appointment of a central banker with a certain degree of conser-
vativeness ¯ and term length T: An in°uence can also be exerted by other factors, such
as the parameter µ; as indicated in (3).
The in°ation rate and the output in equilibrium under the objective function of the


































respectively. The socially expected average loss can be obtained by substituting (7) and






























2(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±T)2f±
T ¡ T ln± ¡ 1 + [
®¯2(¸2 + ®)





¢ < 0: When the conservativeness ¯ is given, we can ¯nd out whether
the optimal term length exceeds one period by using the necessary condition stated by
W&W. If ¯ · H; where H = 1+(1+¸2=®)1=2 > 1; the optimal term length T should be
one period. If ¯ > H; it is possible that T > 1 which ful¯lls the following condition
±
T ¡ T ln± ¸ 1 + [1 ¡
®¯2(¸2 + ®)
(¸2 + ®¯)2 ]A: (10)
By ignoring the integer constraints of the ¯rst order condition,
@LT
@T = 0, we can ¯nd the










2 > 0. Figures 1 and 2 show the simulation result of the ¯rst
order condition (the solid lines in Figure 1 and the dashed line in Figure 2). An increase of
the conservativeness ¯ would lead to an increase in the optimal term length T. However,
the optimal term length T can only approach its upper limit asymptotically (for instance
T = 23 in Figure 1).
2 Conservativeness
W&W treat the parameter ¯ as a given constant. However, many other studies, for
instance the studies of Rogo® (1985) and Alesina and Gatti (1995), have suggested that the
parameter of conservativeness ¯ should be optimally determined and therefore should be
determined in conjunction with the optimal term length. We ¯rst consider the relationship
between the optimal conservativeness and the term length. If the central bank in the
study is completely partisan, the decision is based on the incumbent's objective function.
Therefore we have to use the median voter's loss function as an indirect objective function
to identify the optimal parameters. However, according to the setting by W&W, the only
di®erence among the sectors is the desired rate of in°ation ¼¤
i; which has been treated as
a random variable. A term such as (¼¤
it ¡¦¤
M)2 is a known constant from the perspective
of an agent in sector i; its expectation from the perspective of sectorial anonymity is ¾2
¼¤
i:
Moreover, it will be clear later that ¾2
¼¤
i has no power to in°uence the decision on the
optimal parameter ¯ and the optimal term length T. Hence it is not important who is
to appoint the central banker, since the optimal decision could be based on the average
expected social loss function (9).
In the absence of political uncertainty, i.e., ¾2
¢ = ¾2






























then indicates that the optimal parameter ¯¤ has to be larger than 1: Thus, as shown by
Rogo® (1985), a more conservative central bank (¯¤ > 1) is an optimal choice.
5When political uncertainty is introduced into the model, the optimal conservativeness
















(¸2 + ®¯¤1)3 ¾
2
"] = 0;
suggests that the optimal conservativeness ¯¤1 would be smaller than that in the absence
of political uncertainty ¯¤: (Like most other studies, we here ignore the multi-solution.)
An important fact is that a more conservative central bank may not be the optimal
choice if the political uncertainty ¾2
" is large enough. Considering the constraint condition,
¯ ¸ 1; the optimal parameter ¯¤1 could reduce to 1: This is because within the framework
proposed by W&W, the political uncertainty makes no contribution to the level of the
mean, or of the in°ation bias. In other words, the in°ation bias and the expected in°ation
rate would not be a®ected by the political uncertainty. The uncertainty has e®ects merely
on the second moment of the variables.
In the case of a multi-term central banker, the ¯rst order condition with respect to

















(¸2 + ®¯¤T)3 ¾
2
"] = 0; (12)
where T ¸ 1: Thus we have a sequence of optimal parameters of conservativeness f¯¤Tg
corresponding to the term length T: By neglecting the integer constraint, ¯¤T may be
regarded as a function of T: The simulation result in Figure 2 (the solid line) shows
that ¯¤T increases monotonically corresponding to the increase of T: This can be easily












(1 ¡ ±)®2µ2(¸2 + ®)¯¤T¾2
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¡(1 ¡ ±)®2µ2(¸2 + ®)¯¤T¾2
"±T ln±=(1 ¡ ±T)
3¸4k2(¸2=¯¤T + ®)2=®¯2 + ®¸2¾2
u + (1 ¡ ±)®2µ2(¸2 + ®)¾2
"=(1 ¡ ±T)
> 0:
We can therefore conclude that ¯¤ > ¯¤T > ¯¤1: So an increase of the term length T
would lead to a higher optimal conservativeness ¯¤T.
When either k is small or the shock ¾2
" is large enough, ¯¤1 could be smaller than
H. However, it is also possible for the parameter ¯¤T to exceed H after some periods, as
shown in Figure 2.
6If we put the two ¯rst order conditions (11) and (12) together, we can obtain the
optimal conservativeness ¯ and the optimal term length T: As indicated in Figure 1, the
optimal term length could reach 23 terms, but the optimal term length associated with
the optimal conservativeness is approximately 4 terms (equilibrium II in Figure 2). State
I in Figure 2 is not an equilibrium. However, for ¯¤ < H we have another equilibrium,
that is, ¯¤1 and T¤ equal to 1: So we have a multi-equilibrium solution.
3 In°ation Contracts and Optimal In°ation Targets
W&W have mentioned that a study of the optimal term length with the in°ation contract
is of importance, but they have not given an explicit discussion. Furthermore, many
countries have adopted in°ation targets as a means to reduce in°ation in reality, so it
is worth carrying out a study of the target regime. In this note, we study the optimal
term length associated with the in°ation contract regime suggested by Walsh (1995) and
Persson and Tabellini (1993) and the optimal term length associated with the in°ation
target regime suggested by Svensson (1997). Since the desired in°ation rate is a random
variable, the contract and the target could rely on the state of the realized shock ".
Therefore, two cases are considered in our study, the constant in°ation contract and
target and the state-contingent in°ation contract and target.
3.1 In°ation Contracts
We ¯rst consider the constant in°ation contract. We suppose that the median voter can
add an in°ation contract, c ¢ (¼CB
t ¡ ¼¤
cb;t); which is proportional to the deviation of the




















where c is a constant, that is, c = a. The economic intuition underlying (13) is that the















cb;t) + c = 0: (14)
7Taking the expectation on both sides of the ¯rst order condition (14) based on the infor-












Supposing the central bank to achieve its own desired in°ation rate ¼¤
cb;t; the ratio-
nal expectation about the in°ation rate ¼CBIC
t by the society at time t ¡ 1 is then
Et¡1(¼CBIC
t ) = Et¡1(¼¤












The output under the constant in°ation contract regime is unchanged, i.e., it is the
same as in (8). By comparing (7) and (15), we observe that the in°ation bias ¸k
®¯ has
been completely eliminated, but the political uncertainty is untouched. The average loss












































" < 1 for all T ¸ 1: Considering the constraint condition
that ¯¤T ¸ 1; the optimal parameter ¯ is always 1 for all T ¸ 1: This indicates that a more
conservative central bank is not an optimal choice under the constant in°ation contract
regime. Furthermore, taking this fact and condition (10) into account, the optimal term
length T is always 1:
The constant in°ation target is however not plausible, because the median voter (the
government) would assign the in°ation contract according to the realization of the shock
": In other words, since the in°ation contract is assigned after the election, it could be
contingent on the state of the shock "; namely, c = a¡b"t: The rational expectation of the
in°ation rate should be based on this information. As a result, the constant part a is the
same as that under the constant contract regime, that is, a = ¸k: Taking the expectation
on both sides of the ¯rst order conditions (14), based on the information after the election




t ) ¡ Et¡1(¼
CBIC
t )] + ®¯[E"t(¼
CBIC
t ) ¡ E"t(¼
¤
cb;t)] + b"t = 0:






















respectively. By comparing (17) and (18) with (7) and (8), respectively, we notice that
the average in°ation bias ¸k
®¯ has been completely eliminated under both the constant
and the state-contingent in°ation target regimes, but the political uncertainties in both
the in°ation rate and the output have been increased under the state-contingent in°ation
contract regime. The economic intuition is fairly simple, that is the median voter (the
government) tries to increase its partisan in°uence on monetary policy. This in°uence
works via the central bank's desired in°ation rate. The state-contingent in°ation contract
enables the central bank to carry out the monetary policy so as to approach its desired
level even more closely.








































2(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±T)2[±




Since A is negative, it is always quite possible to have a negative @LTIF"
@T when T = 1: So a
further increase in the term length would lead to a decrease in the expected loss. In other
words, an optimal multi-term central banker is possible. The economic intuition for a
multi-term central banker under the state-contingent in°ation contract is straightforward.
The contingent in°ation contract eliminates the in°ation bias but at the cost of higher
9political risk. This can be interpreted as adding a new cost to the social loss function, if
we take the constant in°ation contract regime as a benchmark of which the optimal term
length is one period. This cost can be partly removed by a multi-term central banker.
3.2 In°ation Target
We now suppose that the society has adopted an in°ation target regime. Thus, the
parameter of conservativeness ¯ and the term length T are delegated together with an
in°ation target ¼IF; according to the median voter's preference. We also suppose that the
implicit output target is yN +k for all sectors. The new objective function of the central

























t ) = 0: (21)
We ¯rst consider the constant in°ation target ¼IF
t = h: By taking the expectation on both
sides of (21) and assuming that the in°ation would ful¯ll the condition Et¡1(¼CBIF
t ) =
Et¡1(¼¤
cb;t), the in°ation target should be valued as
h(= ¼
IF






Accordingly, the in°ation and output become
¼
CBIF












respectively. Therefore, both the in°ation bias and the political uncertainty have been
completely eliminated from the economy. This leads to a better situation than that under
the in°ation contract regime.
The optimal conservativeness and the term length can be determined by minimizing














2(1 ¡ ±)2 ¡
®T±T(1 ¡ p)¾2
¢
2(1 ¡ ±T)(1 ¡ ±)
:
10As a result, we have,
¯
¤ = 1 and T
¤ = 1:






2(1 ¡ ±)(1 ¡ ±T)2(±
T ¡ T ln± ¡ 1) ¸ 0; for all T ¸ 1:
Like the constant in°ation contract regime, the constant in°ation target could be
replaced by a state-contingent in°ation target, that is, ¼IF
t = h + j"t; where h and j are
constants. This is because the constant in°ation target is less plausible even though the
society bene¯ts from it. The state-contingent in°ation target is imposed by the median
voter (the government), which would at least preserve its in°uence on the monetary
policy decision. Furthermore, the central bank is also willing to allow an in°ation target
to be contingent on the state of the shock "t; since its own desired in°ation rate (4) is
state-contingent.





t )] + ut ¡ kg + ®¯(¼
CBIF
t ¡ h ¡ j"t) = 0: (25)
h and j can be optimally determined according to (25) and the median voter's preference,
Et¡1(¼CBIF
t ) = Et¡1(¼¤
cb;t); and E"(¼CBIF
t ) = E"(¼¤
cb;t). As a result, the constant part h is





By substituting (22) and (26) into the ¯rst order condition (25), we obtain the in°ation
rate and the output under the state-contingent in°ation target regime. We have noticed





t : Therefore the equilibria under two state-
contingent regimes are equivalent. Thus, the optimal parameter of conservativeness under
the state-contingent in°ation target regime is always 1 and the optimal term length could
be more than one period.
Our main conclusions are summarized in Table 1. Even though the parameter ¯
can be determined independently of the term length T; it is possible to have an optimal
multi-term central banker under both state-contingent regimes.
Our discussion in this note focuses on the optimal term length. Even if the permanent
shifts in long-run median voter's preferences and the optimal term length are disregarded,
11our results are still helpful in understanding the in°ation target regime. The constant
in°ation target can improve the economy to the best possible situation, but it is less
plausible. In other words, it reallocates the credibility problem rather than solving it.
On the other hand, it is plausible to have a state-contingent in°ation target that allows
the in°ation surprise policy to exert its e®ect to the maximum extent. Thus, there could
be a trade-o® between the in°ation bias and the politically induced variability. This is
consistent with the ¯nding in Lin (1997).
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12Table 1
Optimal Conservativeness Optimal Term Length
Constant In°ation Contract ¯ = 1¤ T = 1
state-contingent In°ation Contract ¯ = 1 T ¸ 1
Constant In°ation Target ¯ = 1¤ T = 1
state-contingent In°ation Target ¯ = 1 T ¸ 1
¤ obtained by the constraint condition ¯ ¸ 1:
13Figure 1









The dot line represents the asymptotic line.
Values of parameters:
® = 2:5; ¸ = 3; ± = 0:7; µ = 0:9; p = :9; k2 = 2:5; ¾2
u = :5; ¾2
" = 30; ¾2
¢ = :9:
14Figure 2














Values of parameters are the same as those in Figure 1.
15